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Abstract 
  This paper first examines a price-setting mixed duopoly game with production 
subsidies where a public firm acts as a leader against a private firm. Second, the paper 
examines a price-setting duopoly game with production subsidies where the public firm 
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1. Introduction 
  In recent years, the theoretical analysis of privatization of public firms has been 
extensively studied by many researchers. For instance, White (1996) shows three effects 
of production subsidies in a mixed Cournot oligopoly market regarding privatization and 
efficiency. First, when subsidies are used before and after privatization, privatization does 
not change economic welfare. Second, if subsidies are used only before privatization, then 
economic welfare is always lower after privatization. Third, the subsidy contributes to 
overall efficiency in a mixed Cournot market due to cost distribution effects. 
Poyago-Theotoky (2001) extends the work by White (1996) and shows that the optimal 
production subsidy is identical irrespective of whether (i) a public firm and n private firms 
simultaneously choose output, (ii) the public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader, or (iii) all 
firms behave as profit-maximizers. In addition, Ohnishi (2020) analyzes the 
quantity-setting games developed by Poyago-Theotoky (2001) with price-setting games 
and shows that the result of price-setting games is essentially the same as that of 
quantity-setting games. 
  Fjell and Heywood (2004) examine privatization of a public firm in a quantity-setting 
mixed Stackelberg oligopoly and show that when the public firm remains a leader after 
privatization, economic welfare will be reduced after privatization. In this paper, we study 
privatization of a public firm in a price-setting mixed Stackelberg oligopoly. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic 
setting. Section 3 examines the mixed Stackelberg market. Section 4 studies the privatized 
Stackelberg market. Section 5 compares the result of the mixed Stackelberg market with 
that of the privatized Stackelberg market. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Basic setting 
  There is an industry composed of a public firm and a private firm producing 
imperfectly substitutable goods. In the remainder of this paper, subscripts 0 and 1 denote 
the public firm and the private firm, respectively. In addition, when i  and j  are used to 
refer to firms in an expression, they should be understood to refer to 0 and 1 with i j . 
There is no possibility of entry or exit. The basic setting is taken from Barcena-Ruiz and 
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Garzón (2007). Firm i’s demand function is given by 
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where 0a , 0 1b , and ip  is firm i’s price. For the sake of simplicity, we assume 
0.5b . Each firm’s profit is given by 
  ( )i i ip c s q                                                  (2) 
where c  represents the total cost for each unit of output and s  is the subsidy for each 
unit of output. The private firm seeks to maximizes (2). We assume 0 c a  to assure 
that the firms’ production levels are positive. 
  Consumer surplus is given by 
  0 1 0 0 1 1( , )CS U q q p q p q                                             (3) 
where 2 20 1 0 1 0 0 1 1( , ) ( ) ( 2 ) / 2U q q a q q q bq q q . Economic welfare is 
  0 1 0 1( )W CS s q q                                           (4) 
The public firm aims to maximizes (4). In this paper, we solve for the subgame perfect 
equilibrium through backward induction. 
 
 
3. Mixed Stackelberg market 
  We consider the following three-stage game. In stage one, the government chooses the 
production subsidy. In stage two, the public firm sets its price. In stage three, the private 
firm sets its price. Starting from stage three, we obtain 
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where the superscript “M” denotes the value of the mixed Stackelberg duopoly game. 
  In stage two, the public firm chooses its price for given subsidy anticipating how its 
choice affects the private firm’s price decision. Therefore, we obtain the equilibrium 
prices in terms of the subsidy: 
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  In stage one, the government anticipating how its choice of subsidy affects firms’ price 
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choices, maximizes (4). The optimal subsidy is 
  M
2
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where the upper bar denotes the equilibrium value. Since a c , Ms  is strictly positive. 
  From (6) – (8), we derive the following subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes: 
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  Note that the public leader’s price and output are respectively identical with the private 
follower’s price and output. Also note that each firm sets a price that equals c . 
 
 
4. Privatized Stackelberg market 
  In this section, we assume that the public Stackelberg leader is privatized. The private 
leader decides its price to maximize its profit for a given subsidy anticipating the reaction 
of the followers as given in (5). This results in 
  P0
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14
a c s
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where the superscript “P” denotes the value of the privatized Stackelberg duopoly game. 
Furthermore, we obtain 
  P1
19 37 37
56
a c s
p                                                  (10) 
The government optimizes the resulting welfare yielding the following subsidy: 
  P
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  From (9) – (11), we can derive the following equilibrium outcomes: 
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  Note that the optimal subsidy no longer leads to symmetric prices and quantities in 
equilibrium. 
 
 
5. Comparisons 
  In this section, we compare the equilibrium values for private leadership with those for 
public leadership. These comparisons can be depicted as follows: 
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  The optimal subsidy is higher under privatization. The main result of this study can be 
summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: If privatization results in a public leader becoming a private leader, then 
the optimal subsidy, the leader’s price, the follower’s output and economic welfare are 
higher while the follower’s price and the leader’s output are lower. 
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  This proposition states that our result makes a sharp contrast with that of 
quantity-setting market games obtained by Fjell and Heywood (2004). 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
  We have first considered a price-setting mixed duopoly game when a public firm acts 
as a leader against a private firm and have shown that the public leader’s price and output 
are respectively identical with the private follower’s price and output. Second, we have 
examined that a price-setting duopoly game when the public firm remains a leader after 
privatization. Third, we have compared the equilibrium values for private leadership with 
those for public leadership and have shown that the optimal subsidy and economic 
welfare are higher in the privatized Stackelberg market than in the mixed Stackelberg 
market. In consequence, we have found that our result makes a sharp contrast with that of 
quantity-setting market games. 
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